This article describes major differences in research focus and methods between behavior analysis and social psychology, and it outlines some of the ways in which fruitful cooperation between the two fields can be established. Attribution , optimism, and time horizons are considered to be measures of past behavior-consequence linkages, which provide information about otherwise unknown aspects of people's learning histories. Experiments in these research areas of social psychology contribute to the improvement of the three-term contingency by (a) introducing past experiences and (b) providing explanations of behavior variability in the laboratory and in daily life.
A common theme in the recent behavior-analytic literature is the call for more interactions with psychologists and practitioners in other areas. For example, Glenn (1993) advocates the building of intellectual bridges to sympathetic researchers in other areas of psychology and neighboring disciplines, while Czubaroff (1993) urges behavior analysts to "develop strategies for interacting with nonbehaviorist scholars of whatever field ... [such as] building cooperative relations with individuals and traditions . . . that share substantial research interests, even though they have differing terminologies and research traditions" (p. 3). She points out, however, that interactions will occur and cooperative relations will be established only "if behavior analysts can set aside the view that there is only one right way to do psychology or science" (p. 3). One cannot help but wonder: Is this crucial prerequisite likely to be met? It is one thing to advocate cooperative interactions with non behaviorists, but quite another to interact effectively, even when the topics under investigation are quite similar. Interestingly enough, there seems to be little doubt that it can be done and should be done (e.g. , Slocum & Butterfield, 1994) . Again one wonders: How is this to be done?
In this paper, I illustrate the utility of cooperation by examining three KUNKEL areas in social psychology-attribution , optimism, and time horizons-which illustrate the kind of laboratory research that has interesting implications for behavior analysis. In particular, I focus on the activity-consequence linkage that is part of the three-term contingency (e.g. , Lattal , 1995; Morris, 1992) .
Another Country
When one assesses the utility of experiments in these three areas, one becomes aware of several significant differences between research in social psychology and in behavior analysis:
1. There are major differences in the experimental designs and procedures of the two fields. Behavior analysts tend to prefer single-subject studies, whereas social psychologists usually compare various sets of individuals by means of complex statistical measures. Research on the social determinants of a broad range of individuals' activities, for example, usually employs aggregate data sets and emphasizes the random assignment of subjects to control and experimental groups. Such differences in research foci persist even when behavior analysts replicate the work of their mainstream colleagues (e.g. , Dickinson, 1989 ).
Thus it is quite possible that some differences in the empirical results of behavior analysts and social psychologists-and the data's theoretical ramifications-are at least in part the results of procedural divergence. Furthermore, an emphasis on group differences enables social psychologists to discover interesting variations in significant dimensions of individuals' activities. Three major examples are given below: variations among individuals' attribution styles, the implications of optimism and pessimism, and the effects of people's differing time scales.
2. Most social psychologists study topics that appear to differ greatly from those that fascinate behavior analysts. For example, much research focuses on such complex aspects of daily life as attitudes and their change, attribution , attraction and liking , social influence, reactance, and conformity, precisely the kind of "human concerns" which Bailey (1991) believes behavior analysts have neglected for too long.
3. An important aspect of social psychology, and one with farreaching implications, is the severely limited nature of most laboratory experiments. About 85% of participants are anonymous college students who "volunteer" their time in a laboratory for an hour or so (Sears, 1986) . The most significant restriction is social psychologists' inability to make direct long-term observations of the students' daily lives before the experiment begins. Thus , researchers have no extensive information about their subjects' relevant learning histories prior to the laboratory session. Most of the experimental evidence, therefore, is based on the short-term study of normal , intelligent, educated , young adults whose general experiences and specific learning histories are quite unknown. Besides gender, only broad characteristics such as middle-class background can be assumed , and even these are usually disregarded.
Furthermore , researchers typically have little if any control over significant situational variables, as one might expect when experiments are limited by ethical concerns and rarely last for more than an hour.
Social psychologists thus face a dilemma: Either they can study relatively simple activities for which the reinforcement histories are part of the experiment itself, are otherwise known , or can be safely assumed-or they can study complex behaviors and make educated guesses about the relevant learning histories based on broad characteristics such as gender, age, class membership, and so forth. For obvious reasons, experimenters do not wish to make unwarranted assumptions about their subjects' histories. A related problem arises from the fact that the complex activities studied by social psychologists normally have several consequences that occur over time and vary in magnitude, significance, and probability. It is highly unlikely that all of these dimensions can be manageable components of an experimental design within the typical laboratory setting .
The Solution
Today, most social psychologists solve the problem of their subjects' elusive learning history by gathering information about past behaviorconsequence links indirectly, primarily through the use of various questionnaires and other pencil-and-paper tests. In this article I discuss three aspects of that history. The most significant of these is an individual 's attribution , that is , verbal statements regarding the relationship, if any, between one's own (and other people's) specific past activities and various consequences . Some people describe strong linkages between particular activities and subsequent events, whereas others describe weak relations or none (in which case one cannot even speak of a "consequence"). Summaries of such descriptions are referred to as a person's "attribution style." Other questionnaires tap an individual's reinforcement history more directly, for example, by asking about the proportion and probability of positive and negative consequences , and the person's ability to produce or avoid one or the other by performing the appropriate activity. Typically, the summary of responses places an individual somewhere along the optimism-pessimism dimension. A third facet of a person's learning history is the individual's time horizon. Some people are used to looking far into the future, and therefore relate their activities to many consequences spread over considerable time. Others have shorter time horizons and therefore describe far fewer subsequent events as being related to their actions.
Social psychologists have few if any alternatives for gathering information about the relevant past behavior-consequence linkages that are part of a person 's largely unknown learning history. Consider how different many experiments would be, at least in terms of measurement, if the relevant reinforcement histories of subjects were as well known to the researcher as those of his children or even better, her spouse (disregarding other complications that would thereby arise).
When social psychologists analyze the implications of past events for present activities, they sometimes find it useful to speak of "expected behavior-consequence links," or simply of an individual's "expectations." In actual research , "expectations" are not considered to be private events or internal processes with a life of their own that operate independent of the present situation or past events. Neither are they considered to be initiating causes of behavior. Rather, "expectations" are essentially the summaries of laboratory subjects' descriptions of their learning histories, and they reflect the common human assumption that in similar circumstances similar consequences are likely to recur in the present and future.
As the research mentioned below indicates, social psychology focuses on behavior ; investigators want to discover the major determinants of people 's daily activities . For quite some time, psychologists have been intrigued by behavioral variability, both within groups and for anyone individual over time (e.g. , Mischel , 1984) . Hence many laboratory experiments are designed to discover why people in the same situation frequently exhibit different behavior patterns, and why individuals behave inconsistently over time (e.g., Ross & Nisbett, 1991, pp. 90-119) . As indicated below, sometimes it looks as if a researcher is analyzing an internal process , such as "optimism ," but on closer examination the experiment turns out to be concerned with the way "optimistic" persons behave in various situations, compared with the behavior of "pessimistic" individuals.
When modern social psychologists talk about attribution or optimism, they focus not on a cognitive process but rather on the many relevant past behavior-consequence linkages that are now summarized as a person's "attributional style" or "degree of optimism." Researchers would much prefer to have direct information about behavior-outcome links that a person actually experienced , but when such observations are not available , experimenters have little choice but to rely on the individual's verbal statements or paper-and-pencil tests that summarize the essential features of those past events.
In short, several important variables , which at first glance may appear to be cognitive , are in fact procedural substitutes for the lack of direct information about relevant experiences distributed throughout a person's history. The most common of these substitutes are statements of anticipation , in particular the consequences of a behavior that individuals expect to occur, on the basis of their own or other people's previous experiences.
Models of Human Behavior
Like other researchers , social psychologists make some basic assumptions about human beings and their activities. These assumptions reflect a field 's conventional wisdom , and practitioners may not even be aware of what they take for granted. Most social psychological experiments implicitly postulate the following model of human behavior, and most textbook writers appear to be comfortable with it as well: Contextual signal~behavior (expected) consequences. Here the last term refers to an individual's prediction based on earlier experiences. In this way, a person's learning history becomes part of the analysis of present and future activities. During the last several years, social psychologists have increasingly focused on the analysis of the two linkages (indicated by arrows); the three research areas discussed in this paper elaborate the behavior-consequence linkage.
The model used by social psychologists appears to be a close relative of the operant model used by behavior analysts, in particular the three-term contingency: So R~sr. Hence the question arises whether research based on one model is relevant and can be useful for work based on the other. The following sections show that this is frequently the case.
In his presidential address, Lattal (1995) describes several interesting problems which behavior analysts encounter in their analysis and use of contingencies. For example, it is often difficult to separate contingency from the effects of temporal contiguity, and to determine the time frames over which contingencies are effective. Furthermore, the debate regarding molar and molecular accounts of contingencies continues. Finally, Lattal points out that "behavior analysts have only begun to explore the role of past contingencies on present behavior" (p. 221). The difficulties that are likely to be encountered here are suggested by the data sources mentioned in the article: primarily studies of animals and a few that deal with simple human actions. What if anything can social psychologists with their research focus on the complex activities of human beings in social settings contribute to the analysis of contingencies?
In his description of the history of behavior analysis, Morris (1992) indicates that the three-term contingency in its present form is rather problematic. It is inadequate primarily because, in a "temporal ordering such as this [SO R sr] , contextual variables cannot affect the stream of behavior without intervening between Sand R, except as hypothetical constructs" (p. 14). The three-term contingency is also inadequate because of "the social invalidity of certain economical terms of expression " (p. 6). That is , when technical terms are used without sufficiently detailed linkages to the real world, and important variables remain implicit, the wider general audience tends to reject behavior analysts' discoveries about human activities. In order for the three-term contingency to remain a useful tool for behavior analysis, therefore , it needs to be greatly strengthened, and Skinner's contributions need to be "unpacked," for example , by being elucidated in greater detail and expressed in the natural language of daily life. In particular, Morris believes that behavior analysts must discover ways to conceptualize within the three-term contingency (a) the nature and origins of individual differences in behavior within groups and over time and (b) the significant roles of past and present contexts in accounting for such behavioral variability. In part, this can be done by exploring what Skinner "referred to as 'third variables,' that is, [the] conditions that change the relationships between stimuli and responses" (Morris, 1992, p. 13) . What if anything can social psychological research contribute to these areas of concern?
The three areas in social psychology that I describe below make significant contributions toward understanding the operation of contingencies in daily life by elaborating the role of past events in producing behavioral variability. They describe, in preliminary fashion, some of the ''third variables" that Morris (1992) considers essential features of the threeterm contingency. These contributions are possible because behavior analysts and social psychologists alike postulate that past experiences, especially the linkages between a person 's activities and their consequences, are extremely significant for present and future behavior. However, social psychological research indicates that these influences of past consequences on present and future activities involve several interrelated dimensions. These dimensions are especially relevant in the analysis of the complicated activities of daily life that are enmeshed in the complex social and physical context of dynamic urban-industrial societies.
In particular, recent social-psychological research (some of it described below) strongly suggests that individuals are likely to describe their present and likely future contextual events in a variety of ways, which reflect their different past experiences and present situations. Moreover, these several descriptions may not be congruent with an omniscient observer 's description of reality. Social psychologists summarize major differences in descriptions of past experiences by such terms as one individual 's optimism and another's pessimism , but there is no implication or evidence that either is the initiating cause of any behavior. Researchers would readily agree with behaviorists (e.g ., Flora & Kestner, 1995; Moore, 1990 ) that the initiating determinants of an individual 's activities are contextual events. For example, the opportunity to win a prize 'in the face of high odds are aspects of a person 's context; without such an opportunity, the prize-related behaviors of some people and the deliberate avoidance of such actions by other individuals would not occur. Such behaviors or their avoidance , in turn , are discovered to be partly reflections of different earlier experiences with environmental contingencies, commonly summarized as "optimism" or "pessimism." As shown below, such variables are essentially reinforcement histories that begin to operate only when they become relevant in specific contextual situations.
In the remainder of this paper I outline three dimensions of past experiences and their behavioral implications: (a) the existence of a linkage between present activities and later events, (b) the nature of these later events and the probability of their occurrence, and (c) the number of these later events and their temporal distance from the present. The three relevant research areas in social psychology are, respectively, attribution , optimism , and time horizons. Attribution Lattal (1995) points out that the analysis of contingencies, especially the behavior-consequence relation, is fraught with numerous difficulties, even in experimental settings with their manageable variables. One of these, "empirically disentangling the effects of temporal contiguity from those of contingency" (p. 218), has received the attention of social psychologists as well. Research suggests, however, that experimenters are not alone in facing this problem; their subjects confront the same difficulties. For example, even in the controlled setting of a laboratory and when they perform very simple actions, humans frequently make errors in distinguishing "cause-and-effect" relations from randomly occurring events, especially when there is a time lag. The longer the interval between an individual's behavior (e.g., pressing the space bar on a keyboard) and the consequence (e.g., certain images on the screen), the greater is the probability that errors will occur, that is, contingencies will be described when there are none, and none will be described when there is one (e.g., Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989) .
Social psychologists would hypothesize that the task of learning life's major contingencies is likely to be much more difficult, even with instructions, because individuals are enmeshed in the dynamics of daily life where many contingencies are apt to be considerably more complex and time scales are much longer. If we follow Lattal (1995) and define contingency as "a description of the relation between responses and other events" (p. 210), it becomes apparent that social psychologists have been studying various aspects of contingencies for quite some time. During the last three decades, in particular, experimenters have discovered that linkages between the complex activities of daily life and future events are not nearly as simple as initially assumed. All too often, people are not aware of the linkages that actually exist, or they describe linkages that do not exist.
The major variable that reflects these linkages and subsequent actions is attribution. This process refers to the ways in which individuals select and describe the controlling factors of events that happen to them and other people. The selection is often problematic, especially in ambiguous situations, and always Significant, because behavior frequently is a function of the factors that an individual selects rather than of those which an observer might describe. During the last quarter century, social psychologists have paid increasing attention to attribution processes, viewed as (a) the way people select and describe the causes of their own and other people's activities, in particular past behavior-consequence links; and (b) the ways in which individuals explain events that befall themselves and others. Indeed, today attribution processes are the foci of considerable laboratory and field research (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991, pp. 22-95; Little, Oettingen, Stetsenko, & Baltes, 1995; Morris & Peng, 1994) ; much of it suggests that some people find it difficult to state correctly the comprehensive determinants of their actions (e.g., Street, 1994) . Behavior analysts will be especially interested in three major aspects of attribution research: (a) people's descriptions of the linkage, if any, between their own past and present activities and various subsequent events; (b) the great variability of these descriptions of contingencies within a population; and (c) the behavioral implications of these attributions and their variations. Unfortunately, social psychologists all too often talk all too loosely about "attribution" as if it were a phenomenon in its own right, and this leads to problems in analysis (e.g., Hineline, 1992). As indicated below, however, their research indicates that attribution is essentially the process of selecting one controlling factor from among several possibilities, which then helps determine a person's subsequent behavior. This is especially true in ambiguous and/or unfamiliar situations. In short, the work of social psychologists suggests that individuals sometimes select their own contingencies and behave accordingly.
For example, if I receive a poor grade on an essay which I deem to be quite good, I cannot help but wonder: Why did I get a poor grade on a "good" essay? In this ambiguous situation I have a choice of several possible explanations. Indeed, I can relate (attribute) the poor grade to any of at least four plausible factors: (a) my own behavior, for example, insufficient research or hurried writing; (b) the prejudice of my professor who I believe dislikes me and thus gives me unfair marks; (c) my teacher's inability to appreciate my neopostdeconstructuralistic writing style; (d) my being plain rather than beautiful, if I remember last semester's social psychology course correctly. There is no implication here that my attribution has any causal status; rather, attribution refers to the selection of one possible determinant of the low grade (e.g., "insufficient work"), instead of other possible determinants (such as, "unfair professor,' or "being ugly"). Does it matter which controlling factor I select, which contingency I describe, that is, how I explain the poor grade?
One might be tempted to say that attributions are simply verbal statements under the control of the community within which they are expressed, and that they have little further significance. Clearly, when the context and events are ambiguous or open to various interpretations, individuals learn to make one or the other attribution through long-term differential reinforcement from family and peers. However, once an attribution is made, regardless of whether or not it is stated verbally, there will be significantly different behavioral effects. In the example above, if I make the first attribution (or select the first possible "cause"), I am likely to devote more time and effort to the next essay, because my low grade is the result of my inadequate work. But if I make any of the other three attributions (or select one of the other possible "causes"), I will not change my writing methods, because the low grade is determined by factors over which I have no control.
During the last few years, social psychologists have analyzed many facets of attribution, its several major dimensions and implications, and various problems such as the systematic errors which people tend to make (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991, pp. 66-86) . On the basis of this experimental work, researchers have come to view the contingencies enmeshed in daily life as extremely complex and often problematic. At the very least, the contingencies described by normally functioning citizens frequently differ from those an observer would describe, and both may differ from what actually occurs. Social psychologists might suggest that perhaps behavior analysts have taken contingencies too much for granted, by assuming that individuals always behave in terms of the actual relations among actual events, much as in a laboratory setting. In short-term experiments with relatively simple behaviors, and in rather structured field situations under considerable experimental control (such as patients in a hospital), the assumption that the subjects operate in terms of the actual contingencies is no doubt justified; hence it makes sense to disregard the attribution variable.
Complex behaviors that occur in daily life, however, raise questions about problematic attributions, especially in ambiguous situations. For example , considerable social psychological research has shown repeatedly that individuals with different ways of explaining events that happen to them behave differently in similar situations (e.g., Strickland, 1989) . Furthermore, social psychologists have discovered that there are significant systematic variations in the attributions that normal individuals tend to make in their daily lives, regarding both their own behaviors and other people's actions. Indeed, several variations in attribution are so pervasive and stable that researchers now speak of individuals ' "attribution styles," that is, systematic ways of selecting and describing the determinants of one's own and other people's activities, from among several possibilities (e.g., Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988) . These styles include systematic errors and biases, both of which have implications for subsequent activities. I outline two examples of particular interest to behavior analysts.
Locus-at-Control
Although social psychologists typically do not speak of contingencies, they do study especially one aspect of the behaviorconsequence linkage: an individual's description of the degree of control one has over events. Here "control " refers to the existence of contingencies and one's ability to produce or avoid consequences by appropriate behavior, and "lack of control" implies the absence of contingencies and/or the inability to perform the appropriate activities. Many events that happen in daily life are the results of obvious, clear-cut causal factors: Rain falls from clouds, and if one works with metal tools on live wires one is likely to be shocked . In such instances, attributions are easily made and usually correct; that is, the actual causal factor is quickly selected. In the parlance of social psychologists, rain is attributed to external factors (beyond my control) , whereas shock is attributed to internal (or better: personal) factors: I forgot to disconnect the cord. As behavior analysts would say, in the first instance there is no contingency, in the second there is one.
Frequently, however, people are in ambiguous situations or face unknown or unfamiliar events whose determinants can be interpreted in several ways. For example, if I get wet, I can attribute that event to my forgetting my umbrella, or to "bad luck that it rains." Both explanations are equally plausible. Or consider the paradigmatic choice of an individual who slips on a banana peel: "I should walk more carefully," or "who dropped this peel on the sidewalk? " Does it matter which controlling factor one selects for explaining one's fall?
The choice reflects one of several important dimensions of a person 's attributional style: In ambiguous situations, some people tend to emphasize factors that exemplify external control and the absence of contingencies: "Who dropped this banana peel?" Others tend to stress elements that correspond to personal (internal) control and the existence of contingencies: "I should be more careful." Nowadays, these indiyiduals are considered to be near the extremes of the control dimension and are called "externals" and "internals" (e.g ., Lefcourt, 1981) . Their "beliefs are generalized expectancies that reflect the consistent individual differences among individuals in the degree to which they perceive contingencies or independence between their behavior and subsequent events" (Strickland , 1989, p. 1) . Behavior analysts should feel quite as comfortable in this research area as do social psychologists. The three components of "having control" are (a) the existence of a link between behavior and later events, and (b) the ability to behave appropriately, so that (c) a person can produce some (positive) events and avoid other (negative) events. In the complicated situations typical of daily life, many events that happen to citizens are determined by several factors, some of which are likely to be independent of the person; furthermore, individuals are likely to have different behavioral repertories and amounts of expertise. Hence it makes sense for social psychologists to consider control as a matter of degree.
Attribution styles (or consistently selecting and describing various contingencies) are learned in childhood , encouraged by one's social context, and later are maintained by one 's experiences (or one 's interpretations of them) . Consider a personal example: One afternoon a a colleague's young daughter fell with her bicycle on a side street with new tar and gravel , and tore her dress. The father was proud that she wanted to sue the city for damages because workers had not put up any warning signs. When I mentioned this to my daughter (of the same age) , she was shocked and said she would have told the girl to be more careful on an obviously newly resurfaced road. Inadvertently, perhaps, my colleague and I had taught our children to describe and use quite different contingencies. However, it is not enough to say that a child learns verbal statements about contingencies or their absence from parents, primarily because such statements are correlated with differences in subsequent activities (e.g. , suing the city or bicycling more carefully). During the last few years , investigators have discovered a considerable number of concomitants of various attribution styles. For example, physical health, mental well-being, depression, and optimism are related to a person's position on the control dimension; and what matters is not the actual control one has, but rather one's perceived control (e.g., Strickland, 1989; Thompson, Nanni, & Levine, 1994) . As behavior analysts might put it, what seems to matter are the contingencies (or their absence) a person describes, rather than those an observer sees.
Self-Serving Biases
Numerous studies in North America and elsewhere have demonstrated the existence of a "self-serving bias" (e.g., Fletcher & Ward, 1988) . This fascinating aspect of many people's habitual way of selecting and describing controlling factors (their attributional style) means that individuals tend to take credit (i.e., describe contingencies) for the positive effects of their actions: "I studied hard for this A," and to deny responsibility for their behaviors' negative consequences (i.e., do not see a contingency): "This D-is due to an unfair test."
Behavior analysts would again suggest that these biases are primarily verbal reports of activity-consequence linkages, which are learned within a community that reinforces them, and they are of little significance beyond their expression. Yet there is considerable research which indicates that such biases in people's selection of controlling factors are associated with differences in behavior (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991) . Why should this be? In terms of the operant paradigm, a selfserving bias effectively increases the frequency of reinforcers a person predicts and reduces the frequency of aversive effects a person predicts, beyond those inherent in the reality of particular situations. Researchers would therefore expect a considerable impact on the variety and frequency of later activities, and t~is has indeed been observed (e.g., Burger & Burns, 1988) .
To illustrate the complexity of self-serving biases, consider people's tendencies to attribute responsibility to the individual (i.e., to describe a link between an activity and later events) when damage is severe: "Only careless drivers have collisions." However, external factors tend to be blamed (i.e., contingencies are denied) when damage is light: "Sooner or later everyone has a little bad luck, like a fender bender" (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991) . Social psychologists suggest that such a systematic selection of causal factors (usually called a defensive attribution), makes it possible for people to continue driving their cars without undue worries; after all "I'm a careful driver, hence I won't be in a serious collision." Interestingly, another variable that has been shown to affect the attribution of blame is the similarity of the observer and the person in the predicament (e.g., Burger, 1981) . The greater the similarity between observer and victim, the more likely one is to attribute the event to a personal factor (i.e., to describe contingencies): "The old man who died in the collision was my age, but I have much better physical coordination than most seniors, hence I need not worry about dying in an accident."
The last thirty years have witnessed a great amount of research on attribution; yet numerous questions remain: How are attributions learned and maintained? How can attributions be changed? And finally, to complicate matters still further, research suggests that in our culture , at least, some attributions are "more effective" than others , some are "healthier" than others, but these implications depend on circumstance, and they are not necessarily the same (e.g. , Fiske & Taylor, 1991 , pp. 22-95) . Clinical psychologists employ similar propositions in their study of "locus of control" aspects of health (e.g. , Strickland , 1989) .
Optimists and Pessimists
Social psychologists do more than simply assume that the activityconsequence linkages an individual experienced in the past affect present behavior. Because these consequences can be positive or negative to varying degrees and occur with various probabilities, researchers have become interested in the ways in which individuals assess the nature of future events and their frequencies. In particular, social psychologists discovered long ago that some people expect many good things to happen to them , and others expect that many bad events are likely to occur. Such individual differences in descriptions of future events are significant because so many present activities are affected by such predictions, for example, the taking or avoiding of risks.
For several years , social psychological research has shown that people differ in their descriptions of the valences and probabilities of various past and future events in their lives. Moreover, these descriptions may differ greatly from objective measures of past and future events, such as statistics or rigorous extrapolations from present affairs (e.g., Shepperd , Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996) . Researchers assume that people's differential descriptions of their behaviors' likely outcomes, usually summarized as "optimism" and "pessimism ," reflect the various past experiences which members of a population have had, in terms of the proportion and probability of positive and negative consequences.
These crucial aspects of past experiences and their present implications are usually measured by questionnaires. Scheier, Carver, and Bridges (1994) , for example, used the Life Orientation Test, which includes items such as these (p. 1073):
"In uncertain times, I usually expect the best." "If something can go wrong for me, it will." "I hardly ever expect things to go my way." "Overall , I expect more good things to happen to me than bad." Subjects are asked to indicate their agreement with each statement, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Responses are summarized as degrees of optimism and pessimism. Note that each of these statements summarizes numerous external events that have happened to an individual. Thus neither term refers to a disposition , nor to some internal processes which operate on their own. Rather,
